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LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN THE HIRING DECISION
(OR "DO I REALLY HAVE TO HIRE THAT PERSON? " )

I.

·

The Employment Contract I n Tennessee
A.

The relationship between an employee and a n employer i n Tennessee
is a contractual one.

B.

The Employment Contract
1.

The employer-employee relationship is the product of an agreement
or series of agreements between the employer and employee,
including but not limited to:
a,

The nature of the work to be performed;

b,

The duration of employment;

c.

The terms and conditions of employment.
(Hamby v . Genesco, Inc. , 627 S . W . 2d 373)
(Tenn. Ct. App. 198 1 ) ) .

)
2.

C.

The Contract of Employment may be:
a,

Written.

b.

Implied from the conduct of the parties
(Delzell v . Po pe , 200 Tenn. 64 1 , 294 S . W. 2d 690 ( 1 9 5 6 ) ;
Seals v . Zollo , 2 0 5 Tenn. 463 , 3 2 7 S . W . 2d 4 1 (1959 ) ) ,

The Problem of "Promises" Made in Employee Handbooks
and Similar Employee Guides
_
1.

An employee's handbook outlining a company's "Guaranteed
Polices , Practices and Procedures" and providing that "the hand
book is written so that each employee may know and get equal
benefits from these policies that apply to all regardles� of
age , race, color , religion , sex, handicap , national origin or
status as a veteran" was held to be a part of the employment
contract in Hamby v . Genesco, Inc. ,.627 S . W . 2d , 3 7 3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 198 1 ) . That case involved benefits payable to employees
in a plant shut down,

)
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2.

Some stste courts have gone even further, especially i n cases
involving job security. For example, the Michigan Supreme
Court in Toussaint v . Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 408 Mich.
579, 292 N . W . 2d 180 ( 1 980) held that a personnel manual which
stated that the disciplinary procedures it contained expressed
the company's p olicy "To treat employees Blue Cross in a fair
and consistent manner and to release employees only on just
cause" was an employment contract not to release employees
except for just cause.

3.

However, Tennessee has not gon� as far in this area. In
Whittaker v . Care-More, Inc. , 6 2 1 S . W . 2d 395 ( Tenn. Ct.
App. 1 9 8 1 ) a handbook which read
an employee may reasonably expect uninterrupted
employment year in and year out. An employee doing his
work in a satisfactory manner and working for the good of
the organization has little to fear about job security,
was held by the Tennessee Court of Appeals not to constitute a
job security contract, especially when read in connection with
an employment application which provided that following a
trial period of three months, the employee "may be terminated
by either party at will upon two weeks notice to the other. "

-)

D.

The Problem of Oral Statements Containing "Promises. "
1.

Oral statements by employers to employees regarding�
security have even been held to be a jury question as to
whether they are contractually binding in some states,
including Kentucky ( Shah v . American Synthetic Rubber Corp. ,
655 S . W . 2d 489 (Ky. 1983 ) ) and Alabama (Peters v . Alabama
Power Co . , S . 2d 1028 ( 1 983) )

2.

But Tennessee apparently has not gone as far as some other
states in finding oral1promises for job security contractually
binding. The Tennessee Court of Appeals in Savage v . Sp ur
Distributing Company, 3 3 Tenn. App. 27, 228 S .W . 2d 1 22 ( 1 949)
held that unless the employer's promise to employ the plain
tiff for as long as he worked satisfactorily was met by the
counter-promise to work for a certain period the employment
contract was for an indefinite hiring. The U . S . District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, applying Tennessee
law, came to the same conclusion in denying a plaintiff' s
claim that his employer was guilty of a breach of contract for
terminating him after orally promising him he could work for
the company until his retirement as long as he performed
satisfactory work. (Marchant v . Scheule Industries Inc . ,
572 F . Supp. 155 ( 1 983 • In Olmstead v . Community Action
Sources of Morgan County, 494 F. Supp . 699 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , a heads tart
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)

employee sued the CASMC under Sec. 1 983 alleging that she was
promised continual employment by the U . S . Dept. of Health ,
Education and Welfare and the CASMC under an oral contract. The
headstart program for which the plaintiff worked as a teachers
aide was the Mountain Valley Economic Opportunity Authority.
However, MVEOA transferred sponsorship of the headstart program to
CASMC . The plaintiff's argument was that she was told that when
sponsorship was transferred, the program staff was usually trans
ferred intact; however, when the transfer was made, CASMC did not
employ her. She claimed that the failure to rehire her by CASMC
was due to her outspoken criticism of the headstart program
administration. The U . S . District Court held that there was no
contract for employment. The statements were vague and general
and not promises made to any individual, but merely represented an
opinion , declared the Court.
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11.

State Employment Legislation Affecting Hiring
A . State Anti-Discrimination Statutes
1.

Tennessee Human Rights Statute ( T .C.A, 4-2 1-101 et seq . )
a.

Makes it a discriminatory practice for an
employer:
(1)

(2)

b.

-)

c.

To fail or refuse to hire or discharge any person or
otherwise to discriminate against an individual with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges
of employment because of such individual's race, creed,
color, religion, sex, age or national origin;
To limit, segregate o r classify an employee o r applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive an individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect the status of an employee,
because of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age or
national origin. ( T .C . A . 4-21-40 l ( a)-(b) ) .

Defines and restricts age discrimination
(1)

The prohibition relating to age discrimination covers
persons between the ages of 40 through 6 9 . ( T .C . A .
4-21-40 7 )

(2)

Provides that it i s not unlawful
(a)

To discriminate on the basis of age where age i s a
BFOQ, or where the differentiation is is based on
reasonable factors other than age.

(b)

To observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system
or employee benefit plan, provided the benefit plan
is not a subterfuge for age discrimination, except
that no such benefit plan shall excuse the failure
to hire a person or require or permit the involun
tary retirement of any person ( with the exception
of some policy-making executives who have certain
attractive retirement benefits. ) ( T .C . A . 4-21-407)

Provides that i t i s not unlawful for an employer t o discrimi
nate on the basis of sex or religion where sex or religion are
BFOQs. ( T . c . A . 4-21-406)
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d.

Authorizes affirmative action programs to eliminate or reduce
imbalances with respect to race, color, creed, religion, sex,
age or national origin. ( T .C . A . 4-2 1-110)

e.

Defines "Employer" as including the state, or any political
or civil subdivision thereof, and persons employing eight ( 8 )
or more persons within the state, or any person acting a s an
agent of an employer, directly or indirectly . (Note that
definition could include all municipalities whether or not
they employed e ight or more people . ) ( T .C . A . 4-2 1-102)

f.

Establishes a Human Rights Commission. ( T .C . A . 4-21-20 1 )
(1)

Composed o f fifteen ( 1 5) members appointed b y the
governor, five (5 ) from each grand division of the state,
appointed for terms of six ( 6 ) years.

(2)

Has broad powers to investigate complaints of
discr.imination, conciliate such complaints, or order a
broad range of remedies, including the award of
attorneys fees, and cooperate with the EEOC and other
federal and state agencies to eliminate discrmination.

(3)

Complaints o f discrimination must be filed with the
Commission within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory
practice. ( T . C . A . 4-2 1-302) . However, the 1 80 days
statute of limitation does not apply if the complainant
bypasses the Commission and takes his complaint direcly
to chancery court. In Ho e v. Ro H . Park Broadcastin
of Tennessee, 6 7 3 S .W . 2d 157 1 984 the Tennessee Court
of Appeals, Eastern Section, declared that there are
three ways a person can file a complaint of
discrmination:
( 1 ) Administratively, through the Human
Rights Commission, which must be done within 1 80 days of
the alleged discrimination; ( 2 ) Following the decision of
the Human Right Commission, file a complaint with the
chancery court to review the decision of the Commission;
and ( 3 ) File a direct action in chancery court , to which
the 1 80 day statute of limitations does not apply . This
case involved an age discrmination complaint, the
substance of which the Court decided alleged a federal
civil rights complaint under the Federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act; therefore, said the
Court, the one year state statute of limitations
governing federal civil rights actions brought in state
courts applied to the action.

I
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2.

3.

Handicapped Discrimination ( T . C . A . 8-50-103)
a.

Prohibits discrimination i n hiring, firing and other terms and
conditions of employment by the State of Tennessee and its
political subdivisions against any applicant based soley upon
any physical, mental or visual handicap, unless the handicap
to some degree prevents the applicant from performing the
duties of the job applied for or impairs the performP.nce of
the work involved. ( T . C . A . 8-50-103)

b.

Prohibits discrimination in hiring against a person who uses a
guide dog. ( T . C . A . 8-50-103)

c.

Makes a violation of T .C . A . 8-50-103 a misdemeanor. In
addition, the victim of discrimination is authorized to file a
complaint with the Tennessee Human Rights Commission.

d.

Declares that the term "handicap" shall not include any
disease or' condition which is infectious, contagious or
similarly transmittable to other persons.

Discrimination against non-resident local government employees
prohibited. T . C . A . 8-50-107 provides that notwithstanding any
public law, private act or municipal charter to the contrary, no
person presently employed by any municipality, county or metropo
litan government shall be discharged or penalized solely on the
basis of non-residence in such local government. (Does not apply
to Davidson or Knox County . )
a.

continuing residency requirements are apparently
to policemen, firemen and similar personnel
v . Philadel hia Civil Service Commission 424 U . S .
, and are probably legal as to other classes of
municipal employees ( Ector v. City of Torrance, 1 0 C al . 3d 129,
514 P . 2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 ( 1 9 7 3) , cert. denied, 4 15
935 ( 1 974 ) ) , as long as they are not paid with federal
u.s.
funds .

)
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III.

Principal Federal Laws Affecting Hiring
A.

C i vil Rights Act of 1 9 64
1.

Title VI--Prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color or
national origin in any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance. (sec. 6 0 1 )

2.

Title VII--The most significant of the federal laws establishing
employee civil rights in both the public and private sectors.
a.

The core provision makes it an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to:
(1)

(2)

b.

c.

Coverage
(1)

A 1972 amendment to this Civil Rights Act of 1 964
expanded the definition of "employer" to include state
and local governments , governmental agencies and
political subdivisions.

(2)

To be subject to Title VII as an employer the government,
governmental agency or political sub-division must have
"fifteen or more e'mployees for each working day in each
of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year • • • • " (sec. 701) A
government meeting that requirement is subject to Title
VII for two calendar years.

Exemptions and Limitations o n Coverage
(1)

)

Fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation , terms , conditions , or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
�· color, religion , �· or national origin; or
·
Limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or ·tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. (sec. 703)

An employee under Title VII does not include
(a)

Any person elected to public office

(b)

Any person chosen by an elected official to be on
that official's personal stsff
3-.1

(c) -_ An appointee on the policy-making level or an
immediate advisor with respect to the exercises of
the constitutional or legal powers of the office.

. J

But these exceptions do not include persons subject of
the civil service laws of ·a state, governmental agency or
political subdivision (sec. -20 1) , and are otherwise
to receive a very narrow construction to avoid dimi
nishing the overall coverage of state and local govern
ment employees according to the legislative history of
the 1 9 7 2 amendment to the C ivil Rights Act of 1 964.
( 2)

d.

Title VII also provides that it is� an unlawful
practice for an employer to "hire and employ employees
•
,
•
on the basis of his religion, sex or national
origin in those certain instances where religion, �· �
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise. " (sec. 703) (But
the bona fide occu ational ualification exce tion-;fOes
not apply to iscrimination based on race or color. This
provision has been given extremely narrow construction by
both the EEOC and the courts.

I t is not a n unlawful practice for an employer under Title VII
to establish different standards of compensation or different
terms , conditions and privileges of employment under the
following:
(1)

A bona fide seniority system;

(2)

A bona fide merit system;

(3)

A system which increases earnings by quantity or quality
of production; or

(4)

To employees who work in different locations.

'

But none of the differences must arise from an intent to
discriminate on the basis of race , color, religion, sex or
national origin.
(sec. 703)
e.

B.

Sex-based wage differences based on nearly identical
exceptions under the Equal Pay Act are also expressly
authorized under Title VII . (sec. 703)

Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1 963
1.

Amended the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 by making it an
unlawful practice for an employer to:

'

)
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discriminate • • • on the basis of sex by paying wages to
employees • • • at a rate less that't"he rate he pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex • • • for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill , effort and
responsibility , and which are performed under similar working
conditions • • •
(sec. 3)
2.

3.

. )

Coverage
a.

A 1 974 amendment to the EPA expanded the term "employee" to
mean state and local workers employed in public agencies ,
hospitals , institutions and schools , which obviously covers
virtually all state and local employees.

b.

The EPA i s a part o f the Fair Labor Standards Act.
it is administered by the EEOC .

c.

I n 1 976 , the Supreme Court in National League of Cities v .
Usery, 426 U . S . 833 (1 976) , declared unconstitutional the
application of FLSA minimum wage and overtime provisions to
state and local governments (Usery was expressly overruled in
Garcia v . San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, et al ,
�- U . S . � ( 1 9 85) ) . However, Usery did not affect the
application of the EPA to state and local governments.

However,

Exemptions and Limitations on Coverage
a.

The EPA applies only to sex-based wage discrimination. In
other words , the only thing that will trigger an EPA violation
is a wage differential between the sexes in a workplace. It
does not apply to any other form of sex discrimination, to
discrimination in hiring , promotion, discipline , firing based
on race, color, religion, national origin .or any other factor.

b.

Some wage differentials are specifically legal under the EPA.
Those paid pursuant to

c.

(1)

A seniority system;

(2)

A merit system;

(3)

A system which measures earnings by quality or quantity
of production; or

(4)

Any other factor other than sex.

Title VII provides that any wage differential permitted under
the EPA will not constitute a violation of Title VII .

)
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C.

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1 9 67 (ADEA)
1.

2.

Makes it unlawful for an employer to:
a.

Fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms , conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's age;

b.

Limit, segregate , or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's age; or

c.

Reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with
this Act. (sec. 4 )

Coverage
a.

)

B y a 1986 amendment t o the Act, i t covers all persons over the
age of 40 and effectively eliminates mandatory retirement
ages. However , the 1 9 86 amendment also exempts firefighters,
police officers and prison guards until 1 9 9 4 . Until then
municipalities may determine the maximum hiring age and man
datory retirement age for such persons , provided that the
limits cannot be any more restrictive than those in effect on
March 3 , 1983 (the day the U . S . Supreme Court decided EEOC v .
Wyoming , 460 U . S . 226 (1 983) which held that the application
of the ADEA to state and local governments was constitutional) .
The 1 9 8 6 amendment also provided that a study was to be
completed within seven years by the Secretary of Labor and the
EEOC to determine if physical and mental fitness tests are
valid measurements of the ability of public safety officers to
perform their jobs, and that within five years the EEOC is
supposed to develop guidelines for the use of physical and
men t al fitness tests,

)

b.

The ADEA applies to all "employers" having twenty or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.
(sec. 1 1 )

c.

A 1 974 amendment to the ADEA defined "employer" to include " a
State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or
instrument of a State or a political subdivision of a State
•
•
• , " (which includes state and local governments) .
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d.

j
3.

Exceptions and Limitations on Coverage
a.

b.

D.

The constitutionality of the application of the ADEA t o state
and local governments was upheld by the U . S . Supreme Court in
EEOC v . Wyoming , (460 U . S . 226 (1983) )

An employee does not include the following persons for the
purpose of the ADEA:
(1)

Any person elected t o public office;

(2)

Any person chosen by an elected official to be on that
official's personal staff;

(3)

An appointee on the policy-making level o r an immediate
advisor with respect to the exercise of the
constitutional or legal powers of the office.

However , the exemption does not include persons subject to
civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency ,
or political subdivision. (sec. 1 1 )

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1 986 (IRCA)
1.

)

2.

Makes it unlawful for an employer to
a.

Recruit , hire , employ or continue to employ , illegal
immigrants , and establishes an elaborate system of employee
identification and eligibility

b.

Prohibits employment discrimination based not only upon
national origin but also upon citizenship

Coverage
a.

Employment verification provisions:
private, regardless of size

b.

Employment anti-discrimination provisions:
(1)

All employers of over three (3 ) people (except that all
things being equal among applicants for a job, the
employer can "prefer" the U . S . citizen over the foreign
applicant. ) (But see cautionary note below . )
(a)

)

All employees, public and

Employers of 3-15 employees: prohibited from
employment discrimination based on national origin
� citizenship

3-5

(b)
(c)

Employers of 1 5 and more employees: prohibited
.. from employment discrimination based on citizenship
CAUTION: National origin discrimination by
employers of over 1 5 employees is prohibited by
Title VII.
PROBLEM: Is the IRCA-authotized "preference" for a
u.s. citizen, all other things being equal (which
they seldom are) national origin discrimination pro
hibited under Title VII? That is the position taken
by the EEOC.

(2)

3.

Covers U. S. citizens, refugees, asylees, permanent resi
dent aliens, and legalized aliens who have filed notice
of intent to become U.S. citizens

Standard of proof of discrimination
The ICRA requires the plaintiff to show "discriminatory intent" on
the part of the employer; in theory, a showing of disparate
impact will not suffice. However, the reality is that the Justice
Department regulations provide that direct or circumstantial evi
dence, including statistical evidence, will-ile permitted to show
that an employer is guilty of a "pattern or practice of knowing
(Emphasis mine)
and intentional discrimination.

4.

The verification system. (See Richard L. Stokes, MTAS Technical
Bulletin No. 7 , November 1 6 , 1987)

5.

Anti-discrimination enforcement is the responsibility of the U. S.
Justice Department.

)

D.

Civil Rights Acts of 1 866, 1 870 and 1 8 7 1.
Several important provisions of the United States Code stem from the
Civil Rights Acts of 1 866, 1 870 and 1 8 7 1 and are commonly referred to
by their section number:
1.

)

Sec. 1 981. Equal rights under the law. All persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
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2.

Sec. 198 2 . Property Rights. All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory , as is
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit , purchase, lease,
sell, hold , and convey real and personal property.

3.

Sec. 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person
who , under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage , of any State and Territory , subjects , or causes to be
subjected , any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights ,
privileges , or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law , suit in
equity , or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes
of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.

_J

E.

U . S . Constitution
1.

First Amendme�t ( 1 7 9 1 ) Congress shall make no law
establishment of religion , or prohibiting the free
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
Government for a redress of grievances.

2.

Fifth Amendment ( 1 79 1 ) (Due Process Clause) No person shall be
held to answer for a capital , or otherwise infamous crime , unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury , except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces , or in the Militia , when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself , nor be deprived of life , liberty, or
property , without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.

3.

Thirteenth Amendment ( 1 865) Sec. 1 . Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States , or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

respecting an
exercise
the press; or
to petition the

I

Sec. 2 . Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
4.

Fourteenth Amendment (1868) Sec, 1 . All persons born or
naturalized in the United States , and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof , are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

IV.

Advertising and Interviewing, Etc.
A.

Advertising the Job
1.

The EEOC dislikes both word-of-mouth advertising and a reliance
upon walk-in applicants, particularly where the present work force
is predominately white. In finding a company guilty of violating
Title VII for recruiting through a word-of-mouth system that
reached only· the white community, it declared
a word-of-mouth recruitment policy conducted by a virtually
all-white work force, without supplementary and simultaneous
recruitment in the minority-groups' community (by means of
newspaper-advertising and the like ) , constitutes a prims facie
violation of Title VII. (EEOC Decision, June 4 , 1969)

)

B.

2.

The EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines make it a violation of
Title VII for help wanted advertisements to express a preference,
limitation -0r ·specification based on sex unless sex is a bona fide
(Sec. 1604 . 5 )
occupational q�alification.

3.

The EEOC interpretation of the Ag e Discrimination in Emp loyment
Act Guidelines prohibits age limitation language and such terms as
recent college graduates, "young," "boy," "girl," etc. in job
advertisements except when age is a bona fide occupational
qualification.
(Sec. 1625 . 4 )

Pre-employment Applications and Interviews
This is one of the most difficult areas of employment law. A writer
who analyzed the employment application of all 50 state governments
concluded that everyone of them contained "inappropriate" questions.
She defined "inappropriate" as being not clearly job related, those
with potentially discriminatory effects and those that could not
possibly be justified under the cloak of business necessity. (Debra
D. Burrington, "A Review of State Government Application Forms For
Suspect Ques.tions," Public Personnel Management Journal, May, 1982,
p. 55-60) . But that conclusion is not so shocking; it is nearly
impossible to frame any written question that cannot be used for a
discriminatory purpose. The framing of oral questions without
"inappropriate" language is even more difficult.
1.

Legally offensive questions
a.

On page 4-2 is the list of inappropriate pre-employment
inquiries found by Burrington.

b.

O n pages 4-3 through 4-B are samples o f pre-employment
questions which have led to problems with EEOC or the courts
and which may be used as a guide for planning legally inoffen
sive questions.

)
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__

J

Inappropriate Pre-Emplo yment Inquiries Made by the 50 States.
No.
1 . Are you known or have you been known by any other
name(s) ?
2 . Which title do you prefer? Mr. , Mrs. , Miss , or Ms. ?
3 . What is your birthdate? (With EEO disclaimer)
4. What is your birthdate? (Without EEO disclaimer)
5 . What is your birthplace? (Without EEO disclaimer)
6 . What was your age on your last birthday?
(With EEO disclaimer)
7 . What was your age on your last birthday?
(Without EEO disclaimer)
8 . What is your sex? (With EEO disclaimer)
9 . What is your sex? (Without EEO disclaimer)
1 0 . What is your race or ethnic group?
(With EEO disclaimer)
1 1 . What is your race or ethnic group?
(Without EEO disclaimer)
1 2 . Do you have any handicaps or physical defects?
(With EEO disclaimer)
1 3 . Do you have any handicaps or physical defects.
(Without EEO disclaimer)
1 4 . What is your marital status? (With EEO disclaimer)
15. What is your marital status? (Without EEO disclaimer)
1 6 . How many dependents do you have?
1 7 . What is your height and weight?
1 8 . What are the dates of your education and/or degrees?
1 9 . Have you ever been convicted of a crime?
20. Do you possess a valid driver's license?
2 1 . Do you have transportation to work?
22. What were the dates of your military service?
2 3 . What was your rank when you left military service?
24. If claiming veteran' s preference, have you submitted
the appropriate documentation?
·
25. Do you read and write English?
2 6 . What is the lowest pay you will accept?
2 7 . Do you have any relatives employed by the State?
28. Are you willing to travel?
29 . Are you willing to work shifts/overtime?
30. Are you willing to lift heavy weights?
Note: EEO survey detachable from application
EEO survey on separate sheet
·

4

8%

5
16
23
2
12

10%
32%
46%
4%
24%

4

8%

37
7
35

74%
1 4%
70%

4

56%

28

56%

7

1 4%

3
3
1
4
47
20
24
5
22
5
27

6%
6%
2%
8%
94%
40%
48%
10%
44%
10%
54%

2
12
7
8
5
1

4%
24%
14%
1 6%
10%
2%

Source: Debra D . Burrington , "A Review of State Government
Application Forms for Suspect Questions," Public Personnel
Management Journal, May 1982.

)
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SUBJECT
NAME

MARITAL
AND

FAMILY
STATUS

AGE

LAWFUL INQUIRIES

UNLAWFUL INQUIRIES

"Have you worked for this com
pany under a different name?
"Is any additional informstion
relative to change of name,
use of an assumed name or
nickname necessary to enable a
check on your work and
educational record? If yes,
explain. "

Inquiries about the name which
would indicate applicant's
lineage;· ancestry , national ori
gin or descent. Inquiry into
previous name of applicant
where is has been changed by
court order or otherwise.
Indicate: Miss, Mrs. , or Ms.

Whether applicant can meet
specified work schedules or
has activities, commitments or
responsibilities that may
hinder the meeting of work
attendance requ1reinents.
Inquiries as to a duration of
stay on job or anticipated
absences which are made to
males and females alike.

Any inquiry indicating whether
an applicant is married, single ,
divorced, engaged, etc. Number
and age of children.
Information on child-care
arrangements.
Any question concerning
pregnancy.
Any such question which directly
or indirectly results in limit
ation of job opportunity in any
way.

If a minor, require proof of
age in the form of a work
permit or a certificate of
age. Require proof of age by
birth certificate after being
hired. Inquiry as to whether
or not the applicant meets the
minimum age requirements as
set by law and requirements
that upon hire proof of age
must be submitted in the form
of a birth certificate or
other forms of proof of age.
If age is a legal requirement:
"If hired , can you furnish
proof of age?" or statement
that hire is subject to
verification of age. Inquiry
as to whether or not an
applicant is younger than the
employer's regular retirement
age.

Requirements that applicants
state age or date of birth.
Requirement that applicant pro
duce proof of age in the form of
a birth certificate or baptismal
record.
The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 forbids
discrimination against persons
over the age of 4 0 .

)
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)

SUBJECT

UNLAWFUL INQUIRIES

LAWFUL INQUIRIES

HANDICAPS For employers subject to the
provisions of the Rehabili
tation Act of 197 3 , applicants
may be "invited" to indicate
how and to what extent they
are handicapped. The employer
must indicate to applicants
that:
1. compliance with the
invitation is voluntary; 2 .
the information is being sought
only to remedy discrimination
or provide opportunities for the
handicapped; 3 . the infor
mation will be kept confiden
tial and 4 . refusing to
provide the information will
not result in adverse treat
ment. Employers may ask about
handicaps only if they are
trying to remedy past discrimi
nation or expand opportunities
for the handicapped through an
affirmative action program.

The Rehabilitation Act of 1 9 7 3
forbids employers from asking
job applicants general questions
about whether they are handicapped
or asking them about the nature
and severity of their handicap.
An employer must be prepared to
prove that any physical and mental
requirements for a job are
due to "business necessity" and
the safe performance of the job.
Except in cases where undue
hardship can be proven,
employers must make "reasonable
accommodations" for the physical
and mental limitations of an
employee or applicant.

)

RACE OR
COLOR

Inquiry or restriction of
employment is permissible only
where a Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification exists.
(This
Bona Fide exception is
interpreted very narrowly by
the courts and EEOC. ) The bur
den of proof rests on the
employer to prove that a Bona
Fide Occupational Qualification
does exist and that all members
of the affected class are
incapable of performing the
job.

Sex of the applicant. Any other
inquiry which would indicate
sex. Sex is not a Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification
because a job involves physical
labor (such as lifting) beyond
the capacity of some women nor
csn employment be restricted
just because the job is tradi
tionally labeled "men 1 s work" or
"women's work . " Sex cannot be
used as factor for determining
whether or not an applicant
will be satisfied in a par
ticular job.

General distinguishing physical
characteristics such as scars,
etc.

Applicant's race. Color of
applicant's skin , eyes , hair,
etc. , or other questions directly
or indirectly indicating race or
color. Applicant's height or
weight where it is not relative
to job.

i
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SUBJECT

LAWFUL INQUIRIES

UNLAWFUL INQUIRIES

ADDRESS
OR
DURATION
OF
RESIDENCE

Applicant's address. Inquiry
into place and length of
current and previous address.
"How long a resident of this
State of City?"

Specific inquiry into foreign
addresses which would indicate
national origin. Names or rela
tionship of persons with whom
applicant resides. Whether
applicant owns or rents home.

BIRTH
PLACE

"Can you after employment sub
mit a birth certificate or
other proof of u.s.
Citizenship?"

Birthplace of applicant.
Birthplace of applicant' s
parents , spouse, or other rela
tives. Requirement that appli
cant submit a birth certificate,
naturalization or baptismal
record before employment.
Any other inquiry into national
origin.

RELIGION

An applicant may be advised
concerning normal hours and
days of work required by the
job to avoid possible conflict
with religious or other per
sonal conviction.

Applicant' s religious denomina
tion or affiliation , church,
parish, pastor, or religious
holidays observed. Applicants
may not be told that any par
ticular religious groups are
required to work on their reli
gious holidays. Any inquiry to
indicate or identify religious
denomination or customs .

MILITARY

Type of education and
experiences in service as it
relates to a particular job.

Type of discharge.

PHOTO

May be required after hiring
for identifi·cation.

Request photograph before
hiring. Requirement that appli
cant affix a photograph to his
application . Request that
applicant at his option , submit
photograph. Requirement of photo
graph after interview, but
befor.e hiring.

CITIZEN
SHIP

"Are you a citizen of the
United States?'' "If you are
not a U . S . citizen, have you

"Of what country are you a
citizen?" Whether applicant or
his parents or spouse are

-)
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SUBJECT

LAWFUL -,INQUIRIES

UNLAWFUL INQUIRIES

the legal right to remain per
manently in the U.S.?" "Do
you intend to remain per
manently in the u.s.? "
Statement that if hired,
app�icant may be required to
submit proof of citizenship.
If not a citizen, are you pre
vented from lawfully becoming
employed because of visa or
immigration status?

- -)

}

naturalized or native born U.S.
citizens. Date when applicant
or parents or spouse acquired
U.S. citizenship. Requirement
that applicant produce his
naturalization papers. Whether
applicant's parents or spouse
are citizens of the U.S.

ANCESTRY
OR
NATIONAL
ORIGIN

Languages applicant reads,
speaks, or writes fluently.

Inquiries into applicant's
lineage ancestry, national ori
gin, descent, birthplace or
mother tongue. National origin
of applicant' s parents or spouse.

EDUCATION

Applicant's academic,
vocational or professional
education; school attended.
Inquiry into language skills
such as reading, speaking, and
writing foreign languages.

Any inquiry asking specifically
the nationality, racial or reli
gious affiliation of a school.
Inquiry as to what is mother
tongue or how foreign language
ability was acquired.

EXPERIENCE Applicant's work experience;
including names and addresses
of previous employers, dates
of employment, reasons for
leaving, salary history.
Other countries visited.
CONVICTION Inquiry into actual convic
tions which relate reasonably
to fitness to perform a par- 1
ticular job. ( A conviction is
a court ruling where the party
is found guilty as charged.
An arrest is merely the appre
hending or detaining of the
person to answer the alleged
crime.)

Any inquiry relating to arrests.
Asking or checking into a person's
arrest, court, or conviction
record if not substantially
related to functions and respon
sibilities of the prospective
employment.

RELATIVES

Name or address of any relative
of adult applicant.

Names of applicant's relatives
already employed by this com
pany. Names and addresses of
parents or guardians of minor
applicants.
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SUBJECT
NOTICE IN
CASE OF
EMERGENCY

- -)

LAWFUL INQUIRIES

UNLAWFUL INQUIRIES

Names of persons to be
notified in case of accident
or emergency.

Name and address of relatives to
be notified in case of accident
or emergency.

ORGANIZATION Inquiry into the organiza
tions of which an applicant
is a member providing the name
or character of the organiza
tion does not reveal the race,
religion, color, or ancestry
of the membership. 'What
offices are held, if any?

"List all organizations, clubs ,
societies, and lodges to which
you ·belong." The names of organ
izations to which the applicant
belongs if such information
would indicate through character
or name the race, religion,
color, or ancestry of the
membership.

CREDIT
RATING

None

Any questions concerning credit
rating, charge accounts, etc.

REFERENCES

By whom were you referred for
a position here? Names of
persons willing to provide
professional and/or character
references for applicant.

Require the submission of a
religious reference. Request
reference from applicant's
pastor.

MISC.

Notice to applicants that any
misstatements or omissions of
material facts in the appli
cation may be cause for
dismissal.

ANY INQUIRY IS FORBIDDEN WHICH, ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY LISTED AMOUNG
THE ABOVE, IS DESIGNED TO ELICIT INFORMATION AS TO RACE , COLOR, ANCESTRY,
AGE, SEX, RELIGION, OR ARREST AND COURT RECORD UNLESS BASED UPON A BONA
FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION.
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2.

The EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines specifically provide that:
A pre-employment inquiry may ask "Males, Females;" or "Mr . ,
Mrs . , Miss , " provided that the inquiry is made in good faith
for a non-discriminstory purpose, Any pre-employment inquiry
in connection with prospective employment which expresses
directly or indirectly any limitations , specifications or
discriminations as to sex shall be unlawful unless based upon
a bona fide occupational qualification. (sec. 1604 . 7 )

3.

The EEOC ' s Religious Discrimination Guidelines provide that
preselection inquiries which determine an applicant' s availability
have an exclusionary impact on people with certain religious
practices; therefore, they violate Title VII unless the employer
can show the inquiry ( 1 ) Did not have ah exculsionary effect on
its employees or prospective employees needing an accommodation
for the same religious practice; or ( 2 ) was otherwise justified by
business necessity. (sec. 1605 . 3 )

4.

The EEOC ' s interpretation of the Age Discrimination Emp loyment
Act Guidelines specifies that while questions on an employment
application from such as "Date of Birth" or "State Age" are not in
themselves violations of the Act, they will be closely scrutinized
to insure that the questions weren' t asked for a discriminant
purpose. Employment applications cover all inquiries , including
resumes, etc.. (sec. 16255 . 5 )

-)
C.

Arrest, Conviction and Military Discharge Records
1.

Refusal to hire a job applicant based on an arrest or criminal
record must be based on business necessity.
Employer who refused to hire black arrested (but not convicted) 14
times violated Title VII in spite of general policy not to hire
applicants with arrest records because blacks arrested
substantially more than whites (disparate impact) and because
there was no business necessity for the policy. (Gregory v .
Litton Systems , Inc. , 3 1 6 F . Supp. 401 (Cal. 1970) ) . But there
was no Title VII violation when employer discharged a black
employee convicted of theft and receiving stolen goods because he
was employed in a position of access to the property of others
which justified the hotel' s policy of requiring such persons to
(Richardson
have a record reasonably free from property crime.
v . Hotel Corp . of America, 332 F . Supp. (La. 197 1 ) )

2.

Courts are split on whether person can be denied employment based
upon less than an honorable discharge.

)
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D.

Educational Requirements:
Must be related to job performance.
Comp any)

E.

(See Griggs v. Duke Power

Physical Fitness and Height and Weight Standards
1.

Must b e demonstrably job related.
Female police cadet in Knoxville Police Department dismissed for
failing to pass a physical fitness test. Only three men and three
women (counting the plaintiff) had ever failed the test;
therefore, she did not carry burden of proof to establish
disparate impact. In addition, court declared that test was
related to physical traits needed in jo� as police officer.
(Eison v. City of Knoxville , 570 F . Supp. 11 (E. D . Tenn. 1983) )
The U . S . Supreme Court ruled that a state statute that limited the
hiring of prison guards to persons 5 feet 2 inches tall and over
and 1 20 or mor� pounds violated Title VII. Because 4 1% of women
and only 1% of men would be disqualified by those standards that
statute had a disparate impact on women and the state could not
prove that standards were necessary for good job performance.
(Dothard v . Rawlinson , 97 S .Ct. 2720 (1977) )

.- 0

)
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v.

Employee Testing
A.

Title VII Testing Standards
1.

B.

-)

Title VII authorizes the use o f any professionally developed
ability test, provided that such test, its administration or
·actions upon the result is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
(sec. 703 (h) )
a.

However, in Griggs v . Duke Power, the U . S . Supreme Court
ruled that any test that has an adverse impact upon minority
groups and women is illegal unless justified by business
necessity.

b.

Through the 60s and 70s the Griggs standard was virtually
impossible to satisfy and most employment tests and other
selection processes were found to have an adverse impact, thus
were illegal. The Griggs standard is still extremely
difficult to satisfy by all but the most sophisticated
employers. The fact that an employer' s selection process
meets a general standard or practice wili not satisfy the
courts.

The Employer's Testing Burden
1.

In a nutshell here is what an employer has to show:
a.

The test or other employee selection process i s necessary to
the safe and efficient operation of the business (in this
case, the government) .

b.

The test or other employee selection process i s job related
under very strict standards set by or resembling those
established by professional associations, generally by an
industrial psychologist or similar expert.

c.

These standards require:

(1)

Job Analysis--an examination of the actual tasks involved
in the job in question--not the employers general
business but the � itself.

(2)

Test and scoring scheme designed to predict the ability
to perform those tasks.

(3)

VALIDATION--a demonstration that the employment test is
related to success on the job, or a demonstration that
the test represents an adequate sample of performance.
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d.

)

C.

Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selecting.Procedures (�978)
1.

In 1978, the EEOC, U.S. Civil Service Commission and the
Department of Labor and Justice adopted the Uniform Guidelines.
They are the standards by which those agencies will judge the
employee selection processes of employers who are subject to EEOC
investigations.

2.

The Uniform Guidelines apply to:

3.

D.

Then, even i f the selection system meets all the above tests
it may still be held invalid if it had an adverse impact upon
minority groups or women and there is a comparable valid
system with less adverse impact.

a.

All selection procedures: interviews, review of experience or
education for application forms, work samples, physical
requirements, and evaluations of performance; and

b.

All select'ion procedures used i n reaching employment
decisions: hiring, retention, promotion, transfer, demotion,
dismissal, or referral.

State and local government merit systems or laws requiring rank
ordering of candidates and selection from a limited number of top
candidates also fall under the Uniform Guidelines.
(EEOC--Questions and Answers on Uniform Guidelines or Employee
Selection Procedures)

Adverse Impact under The Uniform Guidelines.
1.

Adverse impact is defined by the EEOC as "a substantially
different rate of selection in hiring, promotion, or other
employment decision which works to the disadvantage of numbers of
.a race, sex or ethnic group. " (Q and A, No. 10)

2.

The 4 /5' s or 80% rule. Agencies which have adopted the Uniform
Guidelines will generally consider a selection rate for any race,
.
sex, or ethnic group which is less than 4/5's or 80% of the
selection rate for a group with the highest selection rate as a
.
substantially different rate of selection.
a.

Example:
Selection
% Hired
Rate

Applicants

Hires

80 White

48

48/80

60%

1 /1 or 100%

40 Black

12

1 2/40

30%

1 /2 or 50%
of white
rate
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b.

In theory the 4/5 rule is not a law; rather, it raises an
inference of adverse impact which requires additional
information and investigation to determine whether there is
actually adverse impact. The size of the sample and other
variables obviously influence the results in the application
of the 4/5 or 80% rule.

·c.

Groups are compared to measure adverse impact.
(1)

Selection rates for males and females.

(2)

Selection rates for race and ethnic groups are compared
with the selection rate of the race or ethnic group with
the highest selection rate.
i . Blacks
ii. American Indians
iii. Asians
iv. " Hispanics
v . Whites
vi. Totals

3.

"Bottom Line" Concept
a.

If the 4/5 or 80% standard is met for the total selection
process, then the government agencies which have adopted the
Uniform Guidelines generally do not focus on the individual
components in the selection process for the purpose of
deciding which employers to prosecute for discriminatory
employment practices; they look at the "bottom line. "

b.

However, the practice of looking at the bottom line is only a
policy of prosecutorial discretion. The EEOC also has
significant administrative powers including investigation of
complaints , finding of reasonable cause/no cause, and
"voluntary" conciliation which make up a substantial portion
of the EEOC's work . Iri the exercise of its administrative
authority, the EEOC can focus on individual components in the
selection process,

c.

"Bottom line" concept in action,

-)

Fifty-four percent (54%) of the black candidates and 80% of
the white candidates passed the test for a supervisory
position. Four of the blacks who failed the test sued
claiming that the test had an adverse impact upon blacks.
However , the employer promoted 22. 9 % of the black candidates
and only 13. 5% of the white candidates from the eligibility
list created by the exam. The bottom line was that the test
generated no adverse impact in the total selection process.
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However, ·in this case the Supreme Court ruled that the bottom
line concept does not offer a justification to discriminate
against some persons on the premise that other persons of the
same race were hired.
(Connecticut v . Teal, 454 u.s. 813
(1982) ) .
E.

Test Validation
1.

I n the EEOC's own words in the Uniform Guidelines, "validation has
become highly technical and complex, and yet is constantly
changing as a set of concepts in industrial psychology . " That is
the understatement of the year. Test validation is impossible to
understand without substantial training in industrial psychology
or a similar field.

2.

There are three validation concepts:
a.

Content validity--A selection procedure which samples
significan.t parts of a job (such as a typing test for a
typist) . The weight assigned to each sample must be in
proportion to the demand for that skill on the actual job.

b.

Construct Validity--Involves identifying the psychological
traits (the construct) necessary for successful performance on
the job, and a demonstration that the selection procedure
measures the presence and degree of construct (such as a test
of leadership ability) .

c.

Criterion-related validity--A selection procedure i s justified
by a statistical relationship between scores on the test or
other selection procedures and measures a job performance of a
sample of workers.

_)

3.

The Uniform Guidelines go into great detail about each validation
concept, but the information is absolutely useless to the average
person who makes a hiring qecision, including many personnel
officers

4.

However, one way to avoid the validation trap is to simply not
test prospective employees; especially where it can reasonably be
calculated that the test will have an adverse impact upon minority
groups, including women.

5.

Test validation in action
a.

)

A Boston firefighters test consisting of 1 5 questions covering
current events , spelling, vocabulary , arithmetic, and 7 5
questions taken from firefighters' manual was declared invalid
by the U . S . Court of Appeals. The 15 questions had nothing to
do with firefighting and the 75 questions rewarded
memorization of fire fighting terminology rather than
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measuring traits related to actual fire fighter's performance,
according to the court. A validation study had been done on
the test, which found a correlation between the test
performance and job performance , but not enough to satisfy the
court. (Boston Chapter NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 3 7 1 F . Supp.
507 (D. Mass.
1 974))
·

b.

F.

'Pre-Employment Drug Testing
1.

Law in this area is in the development stage and is confused and
unclear.
a.

l

A paper and pencil test consisting of 120 questions was given
to firefighters and police officers in Birmingham, Alabama.
Applicants who passed the test were placed on eligibility
lists and ranked according to their scores. The pass rate for
blacks was substantially lower than that for whites. The
Court held that use of a test for ranking purposes is
justified only if there is evidence that those with higher
test scores do better on the job than do those with lower test
scores. The city tried to justify the test by using criterion
related studies to show that those with higher test scores
made better academy grades, and had better efficiency ratings
by thei.r supervisors , etc. The Court declared that the
'
validation studies showed that higher test scores did not
predict better performance.
(Ensley Branch v. Seibels, 6 1 6
F . Supp. 8 1 2 (1980) )

For the most part drug testing in employment law deals with
the drug testing of individuals who are already employed as
opposed to applicants for employment. However, probably basi
cally the same standards the courts use to judge post
employment drug tests programs applies to pre-employment drug
test programs. There is an important difference between
employees and applicants for employment; the latter do not
have a property interest in the job. Whether that difference
is significant as far as pre-employment drug testing is con
cerned is not clear.
As to the drug testing of present employees, it has generally
been held that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure applies to drug testing , and
that absent reasonable suspicion of drug usage on the job,
such tests are unconstitutional. In Lovvorn v. City of
Chattanooga , Docket No . CIV-1-86-389 , November 1 3 , 1 9 8 6 , the
U . S . District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
struck down the drug testing program used to detect drug use
in the Chattanoog Fire Department as "overly intrusive and
constitutionally infirm. " The Court found no reasonable cause
f or suspicion of drug use in the Fire Department supporting
the drug testing. The City, declared the Court ,
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has not pointed to any objective facts concerning
deficient job performance or physical or mental
deficiencies on the part of its firefighters , either
in general or with respect to specific personnel,
which might lead to reasonable suspicion upon which
the test could be based.
In National Treasury E mployees Union v . William Von Raab,
Docket No. 86-3522 , the U . S . District Court for · the Eastern
District of Louisiana struck down a drug testing plan applied
to employees who sought promotion to certain sensitive drug
enforcement jobs. There was no reasonable or probable cause
justifying the test, according to the court; rather, the plan
"uses a dragnet approach of testing all workers who seek pro
motion into so called covered positions [and is] repugnant to
the United States Constitution. "
A significant number of other drug testing cases , including
those inv�lving public safety personnel , have found such tests
unconstitutional on the same or similar grounds.
b.

)

Some cases have upheld drug testing programs for government
employees in sensitive or dangerous jobs. In National
Association of Air Traffic Specialists v . Dole, Docket No.
A-87-0 7 3 , March 2 7 , 1 9 8 7 , the U . S . District Court for the
.
District of Alaska upheld an FAA drug testing program required
as a part of an annual medical examination of for flight ser
vice specialists. While the test was a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, declared the court , it was a
search justified in the public ' s interest in air safety. The
random as well as systematic drug testing of prison guards was
upheld by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in in Mc
Donnell v . Hunter , CA 8 , No. 85-10 1 9 , 1/12/87 , 40 Cr'L""2321 on
the grounds that the state had an overriding interest in the
security of its prisoners.
However, even among those cases which have upheld drug testing
programs for public safety personnel or other employees who
hold dangerous jobs, most require at least some reasonable
suspicion of drug use on the part of the individual employee
(a serious accident on the part of a school bus driver in one
case) or some pattern of conduct on the part of individuals in
the agency which denotes drug use.

2.

There i s a possibility that pre-employment drug testing is per
missible as a part of a physical examination, at l east for appli
cants of jobs as public safety personnel and others who hold
hazardous occupations.

)
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a.

Notice that drug testing is required
Notice to job applicants that they are required to undergo
drug testing may help such a test survive scruitny. In Ca pua
v . City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D. N . J. 1986) the
u.s. District Court, in striking down a drug testng program
for police officers and firefighters criticized the plan, in
part , because nothing in the initial employment agreement or
any othe.r civil service rule gave notice to the officers that
they might be required to submit to a drug test after their
employment began. It is doubtful whether the court would have
approved the plan even without that deficiency; however,
notice that drug testing is part of p re emp loyment screening
at least removes that obstacle to the approval of a drug
testing plan.

4.

Accuracy of the drug test
A major problem in this area is the questionable accuracy of some
drug tests. · Several courts have struck down employment decisions
based on drug drug tests either in whole or in part because of
questions about the accuracy of the tests in question.

)
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VI.

Discriminatory Job Placement
A.

Hiring a Person Is Not Good Enough
1.

Opportunities for promotion and training cannot be denied to
employees based on race, color, sex, .religion or national origin.
A black janitor employed by a Tennessee Aerospace enginee�ing firm
"bid" unsuccessfully over a ten year period for promotion into
vacant jobs and placement in job trainee programs , including jobs
as truck driver and storekeeper. He was either held not to be
qualified or told that a better qualified person was sel�cted.
The U . S . District Court held that although the engineering firm's
promotion and training practices were nondiscriminatory on their
face , the practices fell more harshly on black wage earners. The
evidence:
29 of 40 janitors were black ;
2 of 2 jani.tor leadmen were black;
29 of 6 3 laborers were black ;
2 of 2 trash laborers were black;
0 of 1 5 chief storekeepers were black;
2 of 4 4 storekeepers were black;
45 of 45 machinists were white;
1 7 4 of 1 7 4 outside machinists were white.
Except for electrician trainee positions, 2 1 7 of
2 1 8 electrical group employees were white.
(Kennedy v . ARO , Inc. , 447 F . Supp. 1090
( E . D . Tenn. 197 7) )

)

This case illustrates the courts will not limit their focus on the
treatment of the person complaining of discrimination but will
review the overall hiring and placement practices of an organiza
tion and will use statistical evidence to find evidence of
employment discrimination.
B.

Discriminatory Placement of Minority Groups in "Dirty" Jobs.
A black man applied for job in Tennessee hospital and asked for
clerical jo b . He had had experience at Austin Peay State University
as a typist and clerk . After he applied for the job at the hospital,
he worked three months at Arnold Engineering as a clerk. He was
discharged there for unsatisfactory work performance, but his
supervisor told the personnel director at the hospital that he was one
of the best typists he had ever seen.
The hospital hired the black man as a dishwasher. His performance as
a dishwasher was good , and he was transferred to housekeeping
department where he cleaned rooms . At the end of his first year, he

)
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got an excellent job performance rating.
He asked for transfer to job
as a clerk in dietary department. He passed the typing test but a
white woman was hired for the job. He was told his job performance
was unsatisfactory based on disciplinary reports that he claimed he
had never seen. He filed a complaint with the Tennessee Human Rights
Commission which entered into a conciliat ion agreement with the
hospital under which the hospital promised to promote the black man to
the first position for which he was qualified.
No one ever contacted him about another' job in the hospital. He
noticed a job opening for a clerk in the business office but was told
that the job might not even be filled. It was later filled by a white
woman. The supervisor in the business office refused to accept him as
an employee.
Court held that the black man was the victim of discrimination. The
evidence in addition to his placement in the dishwashing job: no
black had ever held a clerical j ob in the hospital.

)

But an interesting aspect of this case is that the hospital argued
that the black man was denied a promotion because of poor job
performance. He had been written up for various infractions ,
including tardiness (what the other infractions were i s not clear in
the case) . However, the hospital was faced with its own excellent
performance rating of the man. (Mosley v. Clarksville Memorial
Hospital, 574 F . Supp. 224 (M . D . Tenn , 1983 ) )

)
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VII. Sex Discrimination
A.

EEOC's Sex Discrimination Guidelines.
It is an unlawful employment practice under the EEOC Sex
Discrimination Guidelines to:

)

B.

1.

Classify or advertise a job as "male" or "female";

2.

Maintain separate seniority lists or lines of progression based on
sex, unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualifications ( BFOQ)
for the job;

3.

Limit or restrict the employment of mar,ied women but not of
married men;

4.

Provide different fringe benefits--including medical, hospital and
life insurance., retirement, and merit pay--in a manner which has
an adverse impact on women , such as limiting benefits to the "head
of the household" or "principal wsge earner";

5.

Make benefits available for the wives and families of male
employees but not for the husbands and families of female
employees;

6.

Exclude female applicants from employment consideration or female
employees from employment opportunities because of pregnancy , or
discriminate in any other manner, including the award of benefits,
on the basis of pregnancy;

7.

Refuse to hire or otherwise provide employment opportunities for
women because of the alleged preferences of co-workers , clients ,
customers or the employer--except where sex is a BFOQ; and

8.

It is also an unlawful practice for the employer to adhere to
state "protective" laws for women which are in conflict with and
superseded by Title VII.

Intentional Pretextual Discrimination
Storey v . City of Sparta Police Department, 667 F . Supp 1 164
(M.D . Tenn. 1987)
In August, 1984 a 3 6 year old woman with an associate degree in
administration of justice applied for a job as a police officer in the
·
Sparta Police Department. A week later she was interviewed by the
chief of police who told her that there were two vacancies and that
she was the best qualified applicant for the job. He also told her
that some of the members of the board of mayor and aldermen might have

)
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an "attitude problem" about hiring a female police officer. He further
told her that he might be able to hire her as early as the mi.ddle of
October , 1984. However, on October 3 , 1984 he told her that he could
not hire her because she was a woman, and that women were not minori
ties for the purposes of affirmative action. According to testimony
in the case, the city was concered about ·responding to a HUD recommen
dation that its UDAG eligibility be decertified because of a minority
under-representation in its workforce. She told the city administra
tor that she wanted to speak to the city council, but the city admim
istrator advised her not attend the October 4 meeting of the council.
While she did not attend that meeting , she attended the October 1 4
meeting where she presented her qualifications. The chief of police
recommended a black male for the job as police officer, but apparently
the council rejected him because he had earlier quit the same job.
One aldermen suggested to the board that the city hire some minori
ties and employ them long enough to obtain the federal grant money
and then dismiss them during their probationary period ! The council
decided to advertise the vacanct police officer position and at its
November meeting to hire an officer from among the three most
qualified candidates selected by the chief of police and the city
administrator.
On October 2 3 , 1984 Storey filed a complaint of sexual and racial
discrimination with the EEOC (she also claimed to be an Indian) . On
October 3 1 , 1984 she was interviewed by both the chief of police and
the city administrator. During that interview she was told that a
female police officer would be a first for Sparta, and was asked how
her husband would feel about her riding with male officers.
Several other applications for the job were received before the
November 1 meeting of the city council, but no other applicants were
interviewed for the job. However, at the November 1 meeting of the
city council , no mention was made of hiring a new police officer, and
the chief of police was never asked to report on his search for
qualified applicants for the job and he made no attempt to address the
council on the subject even though he had the right to bring businees
before the council.
Both the chief of police testified that there was a manpower shortage
in the police department at the time he and the city administrator
interviewed Storey. During the next sixteen months overtime hours
were paid to Sparta police officers for every pay period except three,
but no one was hired as a police officer until February 20 , 1986 .
The police department also lost another two or three police officers,
either permanently or temporarily , during that period.
When the chief of police office became vacant in January , 1 9 86 Storey
applied for the job, noting on the application that she was also
In its March 6 , 1 986
interested in a job as a police officer.
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meeting , the city council , on the recommendation of the city admi
nistrator, decided to hire a temporary police officer. However,
the council , for the first time , established the requirement that
the police officer had to be certified, and declared that no pre
ference would be given to the temporary officer for full-time
employment. A female was given the temporary job; she worked until
August , 1986 and was reemployeed in December, 1986.
A few days after it hired its first female officer (as a temporary
employee) the city council discussed hiring another police officer and
at its March 20 , 1986 meeting , the council decided to hire a permanent
police officer. This time no mention was made of hiring only a cert
ified officer. Storey was notified by mail of the vacancy and she
telephoned her interest in the job. An experienced male police
officer was hired in April, and another experienced male officer was
hired in September , 1986. Storey was never - offered a job as a police
officer.
The U . S . District Court held that Storey was the victim of inten
tional sexual discrimination. The Court declared that the Mc Donnell
Douglas Corporation v. Green test, adapted to sex discrimination,
requires that for a female to make a prims facie case of discrimina
tion ,_ she has to show that

)

l.

She i s a female.

2.

She applied for and was qualified for the job.

3.

Despite her qualifications , she was rejected for the job.

4.

After her rejection, the postion remained open, and the
employer continued to seek other applicants from persons of
the applicant' s qualifications.

The City of Sparta conceded the first two compenents to Storey, but
contested the last two components on the grounds that Storey could not
have been rejected because there was no vacancy in the job as police
officer when she interviewed for the job in October , 1984. However,
the court declared that a vacancy did exist. As evidence that the
vacancy existed the Court pointed to:" the decision of the city coun
cil that a vacancy existed; the advertisement of the job and the
acceptance of applicants; the knowledge of the chief of police , com
municated to the city council, that the police department was
understaffed; the unappropriated fund balance in the city budget
which was apparently set aside for the hiring of police officers;
and the overtime worked by Sparta police officers during the eighteen
months a police officer was not hired (which the chief of police
testified could have funded an additional officer) .

)

I
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The Court got around the fourth component of the McDonnell Douglas test
by declaring that the test was a variable one depending on the cir
cumstances and that each element did not have to be satisfied in every
case. An employer , said the court, could not pay overtime as a
subterfuge to discriminate.
"Title VII �mposes no obligation on the
employer to hire anyone unless the refusal is motivated by discrimi
nation. " (Emphasis the Court' s) The Court announced that
• • • once an employer makes a conscious,
deliberate decision
to fill a position , advertises the vacancy , and accepts
applications , it will be hard put to claim that a legitimate
business judgment was thereafter made to eliminate the
position, especially when the only significant intervening
event is the appearance of a qualified . minority applicant.

The Court did not stop there. It declared that even if Storey had
not been able to make a prima facie case under the Mc Donnell Douglas
test she would still not have been out of court because she presented
.
direct evidence of discrimination , and the Mc Donnell Douglas test
applies when only indirect evidence of discrimination is available,
reasoned the Court. Storey' s direct evide nce was the statement of the
chief of police that he wouldn't hire her because she was a woman and
that there might be an attitude problem on the part of the city coun
cil towards a female police officer, the questions about her husband's
attitude towards her riding around with male officers, comments made by
the city council , and the hiring of a female police officer only on a
temporary basis (which the Court also found represented illegal reta
liation against Storey for her filing of a complaint with the EEOC ) .

.)

The City' s explanation that its solicitation of applications in
October, 1984 was an effort to attract racial minorities to preserve
its federal grants was not believed by the Court, which declared that
police officeres were sought because the police department was
understaffed and overworked. "The plaintiff was rejected, not because
of what she wasn' t--a black--but, rather, · because of what she was--a
woman, concluded the Court.
c.

Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
1.

The EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines interpret the BFOQ
exception very narrowly. It will not f ind a BFOQ in the following
situations:
a.

The refusal t o hire a woman because of her sex based o n the
assumption of the comparative employment characteristics of
women in general. For example, the assumption that the
turnover rate among women is higher than men.
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b.

C•

2.

The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped
characteristics of the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for
example, that men are less capable of assembling intricate
equipment; that women are less capable of aggressive selling
techniques.
The refusal to hire an individual because of the preference of
co-workers, the employer, clients or customers, except where
it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or
genuineness--an actor or actress, for example. ( Sec. 1 6 0 4 . 2)

Proving that sex is a BFOQ is an almost impossible task.
establish a BFOQ an employer has to show that :

To

a.

The essence of the business operation would be undermined by
not having members of one sex exclusively;

b.

There are no alternatives that have a less adverse impact.
(Dothard ,/. Rawlinson, 9 7 S .Ct. 2720 (197 7 ) )
(1)

I n Dothard a state regulation prohibiting females from
holding "contact" guard positions in an all-male maximum
security prison was held by the U . S . Supreme Court to be
a BFOQ. The Court reasoned that Title VII rights must be
balanced against the possibility of a disruption in the
prison system, and that the balancing test in this case
weighed in favor of the regulation because, "In a prison
system where violence is the order of the day, where
inmate access to guards is facilitated by dormitory
living arrangements, where every institution is
understaffed, and where a substantial portion of the
inmate population is composed of sex offenders, there are
few visible deterents to inmate assaults on women
custodians . "

(2)

But in Gunther v . Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 6 1 2
F . 2d, 107 9 , (1980 ) , the Court of Ap,Peals in a similar
case ruled in favor of a female guard who sought a
promotion from Corrections Officer I to Corrections
Officer II. The CO Is did not perform many of the
prisoner contact duties performed by the CO !Is. The
plaintiff conceded that inmates right to privacy would
suffer is she performed strip searches and surveillance
of prison showers and toilets performed by the CO !Is, and
that if the prison gave her limited duties someone else
would have to perform the duties she didn't perform,
However, the Court ruled that not only must the state
show that, "the hiring of women would undermine the
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essence of the prison administration , " the state must
"also demonstrate it could not reasonably rearrange j ob
responsibilities in a way to minimize the clash between
privacy interests of the inmates and the
nondiscrimination principle of Title VII. " The Court also
relied on proof that there were CO !Is in a maximum
security male institution iri the state, and that more
male COils had performed limited, single job functions
for, several years without undermining the institution.

'

D.

Sex-plus Discrimination
1.

Sex-plus discrimination is when the employer penalizes members of
one sex because of their sex plus another factor or condition.
(The most common example is refusing to , hire women with
children--a sex plus children condition.
a.

The u. R. Supreme Court has ruled that an employer' s policy of
hiring men with pre-school children while refusing to hire
women with pre-school children is illegal sex discrimination.
However, an interesting aspect of that case is that the Court
also said that such a policy would be legally justified if the
employer could show that the child care obligations makes
women substantially poorer workers. (Phillips v . Martin
Marietta Corp . , 400 u.s. 592 (1969 ) ) .
(1)

Making such a showing would b e a nearly impossible burden
to carry for virtually any employer.

(2)

But an employer can impose legitimate job requirements
which apply to both sexes.
A female cable splicer was required to travel extensively
as a part of her job. She objected to the travel because
she had trouble arranging for child care. Her employer
permitted her to reschedule job assignments and even
offered her other jobs not requiring travel, but which
paid considerably less. In the face of her continual
objections and refusals to travel, she was eventually
fired. The Court of Appeals held that the travel
requirement was a legitimate one and that her employer
did not discriminate against her for making her travel
even if it interfered with her child care
responsibilities. In addition, the travel assignments
were made on the basis of a seniority system which
insulated the employers action against a discrimination
claim under Title VII . (Giocolchea v . Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Company,
F . 2d
(9th Cir.
1984)
__
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b.

Marital status:
The EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines provide that an
employer's rule which forbids or restricts the employment of
married women and which is not applicable to married men is
( Sec. 1604. 4 )
sex discrimination.

D.

Height, Weight and Physical Agility Requirements
l.

Height, weight and physical agility requirements that have an
adverse impact on women must be job related.
In a landmark U . S . Supreme Court case, Alabama's minimum
height and weight requirements for prison guards were stuck
down. A 22 year old woman with a college degree was denied a
job as a prison guard in a maximum security prison because she
did not meet the minimum physical standards of 5'2" in height
and 1 20 lbs. in weight. The Supreme Court found that while
those standards would respectively exclude 1 . 28% and 2 . 3 5% of
men, they would respectively exclude 3 3 . 29 and 2 2 . 29% of
women--a disparate impact. The state could not prove that the
standards were job-related; to do so it would have had to show
that there was a correlation between the height and weight
requirement and strength. The standards were a violation of
Title VII. (However, in the same case, a regulation
prohibiting women from job assignments to "contact positions"
_!!! job related , thus a BFOQ, because 22% of the men in the
maximum security prison were sex offenders where the presence
of women would be a threat to the basic control of the
prison . ) ( Dothard v . Rawlinson , 9 7 S .Ct 2720 ( 1 9 77 ) )

)

2.
E.

Like all tests , physical agility tests must be "validated" if they
have an adverse impact upon women.

Sex Stereotyping
l.

Two women had worked for Hertz Corporation in Memphis for several
years as rental representatives. They unsuccessfully applied for
promotion to station manager once in 1 978, twice in 1 9 79 , and once
in 1 9 8 1 . In response to their suit, Hertz alleged that the women
were guilty of various kinds of misconduct including imperfect
accounting , rudeness and hopping over the counter. The District
Court's opening remarks indicate the direction this case went:
"This case presented to the Court a disgusting saga of the ongoing
activities in employer-employee relations in the Hertz Corporation
in Memphis, Tennessee. The Court finds that the men were promoted
into station manager jobs because a cadre of male management
preferred men in management positions at Hertz and disallowed the
promotion of women. " Testimony in this case was that the city
manager (for Hertz) stated on various occasions that women
shouldn't be managers because:
7-7

1.

They couldn't g o away for training.

2.

Women couldn't follow irate male customers into the
restroom.

3.

A woman's place i s i n the kitchen.

The hopping over the counter accusation against one female rental
representative particularly caught the eye of the Court , which
found that she locked herself out of the counter area by accident
and when what appeared to be a stranger came up to the counter the
woman, rather than make him wait for service until she could
locate keys, said "to Hell with it" and jumped over the counter.
But , said the Court , "The stranger turned out to be none other
than a stuffy and pretexteous regional manager of the Hertz
Corporation. He testified he was ' shocked' to see such behavior,
which is ridiculous in the light of Hertz Corporation' s national
advertising campaign featuring o. J. Simpson hopping over suit
cases and obst� cles in airports. " The city manager (for Hertz)
could not defend hiring male managers over females except to say
that they came to him highly recommended by high male officers of
Hertz.
This case was also characterized by improper sexual remarks. The
Court said it was the order of the day for male employees to
address questions about sexual activities and preferences to
women, such as "Did you get any this weekend?" The Court issued
an injunction against such comments. (Morgan v. Hertz
Corporation, 542 F. Supp. 1 23 (W .D . Tenn. 1981 ) )

)

2.

A black female was appointed to two year term a s principal o f a
middle school in Knoxville City School System. At the end of two
year term, she was reassigned as a classroom teacher. She sought
and was rejected for several administrative positions. Her suit
alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of race a s
well as sex. However, the Court found that under Superintendent
Hoffmeister blacks with proper credentials had "fared rather
well , " Fifty percent of qualified blacks held administrative or
supervisory positions in 1 9 8 1 and 75% of them held supervisory ,
administrative , or principalship positions in 1 9 7 7-79 school
years. But the Court found that she had been discriminated
against on the basis of sex. The plaintiff had alleged that the
Superintendent of schools had told her on several occasions that
he liked to appoint men to principal staff positions because
children needed a male image and did a better job maintaining
control, etc. , and the Su perintendent did not deny that he made
those statements. The Court also pointed out that no female had
ever been a middle school principal until . the time pertinent to
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and elementary school principalships. In addition, the Court
considered the following statistics related to the sex
distribution of principals in the Knoxville City School system:
1976--54 principals , 1 6 females
1 4 asst. principals , 5 females
1 979--48 principals, 9 females
1 8 asst. principals , 5 females
( Williams v . · Hoffmeister, 520 F . Supp. 521 ( E . D .
F.

Pregnancy and Childbirth
1.

Title VII , as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which
became law on October 3 1 , 1 9 7 8 , prohibits discrimination against
women on the basis of pregnancy .
a.

)

Tenn, 1981) )

Basic provisions:

An employer:

(1 )

cannot refuse to hire , promote, or to terminate a woman
becaus e of pregnancy;

(2)

must treat pregnancy the same as any other disability
under an employee benefit plan;

(3)

cannot compel a woman to take a pregnancy leave at some
arbitrary point in her pregnancy; and

(4)

must provide the same reinstatement rights to pregnant
women, credit of previous service and accrual of
seniority and benefits , that it provides to other
employees who experience a disability.

)
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VIII. Age Discrimination
A.

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
The ADEA prohibits the following employment practices with respect to
persons over the age of 40 (except that policemen, firemen and prison
guards may be hired and retired in accordance with local rules and
retirement plans until 1994 , provided that the limits cannot be any
more restictive than those in place on March 3 , 1983 . )

)

B.

1.

To fail or refuse to hire, to discharge or to otherwise
discriminate against an individual based on age, with respect to
compensation , terms , conditions or privileges of employment;

2.

To limit, segregate or classify an employee, in a way that would
deprive the employee of job opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect the employee' s status based on age;

3.

To indicate · ariy "preference , limitation , specification, or
discrimination" based on age in notices or advertisements for
employment; and

4.

To reduce the wage rate of an employee to comply with the Act.

The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exception

1.

2.

The ADEA contains as BFOQ exception; that is, discrimination is
permitted if the employer can show that age ia a BFOQ. However,
the EEOC Age Discrimination Guidelines specifies that:
a.

The exception shall be narrowly construed.

b.

An employer asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of proving
that:

(1 )

The age limit is reasonably necessary to the essence of
the business , and either

(2)

That substantially all individuals excluded from the job
involved are in fact disqualified , or

(3)

That some of the individuals so excluded possess a
disqualifying trait that cannot be ascertained except by
reference to ages.

Needless to say, it is extremely difficult to prove a BFOQ either
to the satisfaction of the EEOC or the Courts. Most BFOQ cases
involve aircraft crew positions, firemen , and police officers.
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3.

Two landmark u.s. Supreme Court decisions decided before the
1986 amendment to the ADEA which changed the class of person pro
tected from those between the ages of 40 and 70 to those over the
age of 40 had already punched a large hole in many age limitations
imposed by state and local governments on those persons under the
age of 7 0 . Those cases are still current a s to the BFOQ cefense,
except that now they must be read to apply to the hiring and
retirement limitations placed on persons at any age over 40,
including over the age of 7 0 .
Criswell v . Western Airlines, Docket No. 83-1545 ( Decided June 1 7 ,
1 9 8 5 ) ; and Johnson et. al, v. Ma or and Cit Council o f
Baltimore, et, al. '· Docket No. 84-518 Decided June 1 t:-T9 85)
a.

)

I n Criswell, pilots employed b y Western Airlines reaching
their 60th birthdays appli°ed for reassignment as flight
engineers pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement which
permitted cockpit crew members to "bid" for flight engineer
jobs on the basis of seniority . FAA regulations prohibit
pilots and copilots who have reached the age of 60 on
commercial flights, but there are no like prohibitions for
flight engineers. However, Western Airlines also prohibited
fight engineers from serving beyond the age of 6 0 . The pilots
sued Western Airlines contending that the mandatory retirement
age of 60 for flight engineers violated the ADEA. Western
Airlines raised the defense that the mandatory retirement age
was a BFOQ. The jury at the District Court level rendered a
verdict for the pilots which was upheld by the Court of
Appeals and the U . S . Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court in analyzing the proof in the case
acknowledged that there was conflicting evidence over the,
"actual capabilities of persons over 60 and the ability to
detect disease or a precipitous decline in their faculties,"
but there is no doubt about which side of the proof the Court
came down. It pointed out that, "flight engineers have rarely
been a contributing cause or factor in commercial aircraft
' accidents' or ' incidents,' " that other airlines did not have
an over 60 rule for flight engineers, that flight engineers do
not handle the controls of the aircraft except in an
emergency, and that both the FAA and the airlines had been
able to deal with health problems of pilots on an individual
basis to the extent that some who were grounded by alcoholism
and cardiovascular problems hsd been recertified to fly as
pilots and that some pilots who had been unable to pass the
medical test for a pilot had been certified as flight
engineers,

)
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The Supreme Court established the standard in ADEA cases in
the following language:
Under the Act, employers are to evaluate employees
between the ages of 40 and 70 on their merits and not
their age. In the BFOQ def�nse, Congress provided a
limited exception to this general principle but
required that employers validate any discrimination as
' reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business . ' It might well be ' rational' to
require mandatory retirement at any age less than 7 0 ,
but that result would not comply with Congress'
direction that employers must j ustify the · rationale for
the age chose. Unless an employer can establish a
substantial basis for believing that all or nearly all
employees above an age lack the qualifications required
for the position, the age selected for mandatory
retirement less than 70 must be an age at which it is
highly
impractical for the employer to insure by
.
individual testing that its employees will have the
. . necessary qualifications for the job
•

.

Look carefully at the standard. An employer who wants to
establish age as a BFOQ must show :

b.

(1)

That there is a substantial basis for believing that all
or nearly all employees above an age lack the
qualifications required for t.he position, 2!.

(2)

The age selected for mandatory retirement below 70 [ since
the 1986 ADEA amendment, at any age] must be an age at
which it is highly impractical for the employer to insure
by individual testing that its employees will have the
necessary qualifications for the job.

In Johnson, six firefig'bters sued in a U . S . district court
challenging a Baltimore municipal code provision mandatory
retirement for firefighters under 70 years of age. Under the
City's retirement system five of the firefighters had to
retire at 60 and one at 5 5 . The City raised age as a BFOQ for
firemen. The District Court ruled in favor of the firemen,
declaring that the city had shown neither, "that there is a
factual basis for [ it) to believe that all or substantially
all Baltimore City firefighters between the ages of 60 and 65 ,
other than officers would be unable to perform their jobs
safely and efficiently • • • nor that it is impossible or
impractical to deal with firefighters between 60 and 65 on an
individualized basis. "

)
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However , the Court of Appeals held that the City was entitled
to the BFOQ defense as a matter of law whether or not it could
prove that age was a BFOQ. In doing so, it relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in EEOC v . Wyoming, 460 u.s. 226
( 1 983) in which the court said that the ADEA allows a state
the discretion to impose a mandatory retirement age "against a
reasonable federal standard. " Because the federal government
had established a retirement age of 55 for federal
firefighters, reasoned the Caur.t of Appeals , the City was not
required ta make a factual showing at trial as ta its need for
the mandatory retirement age.
The retirement age far federal firefighters survived a 1 9 7 8
amendment t a the ADEA which eliminated most federal age limits
an employment, but it left untouched those relative to
firefighters, air traffic controllers , law enforcement
officers, Foreign Service and the CIA.
The Supreme Court held that the "reasonable federal standard"
ta which it referred in EEOC v . Wyoming "is the standard
supplied by the ADEA itself--that is, whether the age limit is
a bona fide occupational qualification . " The Court went on ta
say that the mere fact that same federal firefighters are
required ta cease work at age 55 does not provide an absolute
defense ta an ADEA action challenging local age limits far
firefighters. Nothing in the civil service history preserving
age limits an federal firefighters suggest a congressional
determination that age 55 is a BFOQ far federal firefighters
far ADEA purposes; rather , it indicates a congressional
determination ta maintain a youthful work force in same
federal occupations, including firefighters. Therefore,
concluded the Court "this civil service provision does not
articulate a ·BFOQ far firefighters [ and] its presence in the
United States Cade is not relevant ta the question of a BFOQ
for firefighters , [ and] it ·would be an error for a court,
faced with a challenge under the ADEA ta an age limit for
firefighters , to five any weight, much less conclusive weight,
ta the federal retirement provision. "
The standards far BFOQ age limitations under the ADEA are the
standards announced in Western Airlines , declared the Court.
4.

Criswell raises the question o f whether many of the laws,
ordinances and policies of state and local governments which
establish age limits for v�riaus occupations , including those
traditionally covered by such limitations , such as policemen and
firemen , will stand up to challenge under the ADEA . If Criswell
does nothing else, it provides additional notice to employers,
bath public and private , that the standard of proof required ta
establish a BFOQ is extremely high.
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Johnson makes it clear that reliance on the federal retirement age
to support a BFOQ defense for firemen and by extension policemen,
cannot be given any consideration by a court.
c.

Factors Other Than Age
1.

An employer may make employment decisions that adversely affect

person 40--70 if the decisions are made on factors other than age.

a.

)

The EEOC Age Discrimination Guidelines provide that
{l)

When an employer uses age as a limit on employment
opportunities, it cannot defend the practice on the
grounds that it is justified by factors other than age.

{2)

When an employment practice has an adverse impact upon
persons between 40 and 70, it can be justified only as a
business necessity.

{3)

The burden is on the employer who raises the "factors
other than age" defense of an employment practice to show
that factors other than age actually exist.

{4)

Difference in treatment of employees on the grounds that
it is more expensive to employ older persons may not be
used as a factor other than age defense for the
employment practice. {Sec. 1625 . 8 )

)
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IX.

Religious Discrimina t1on
A.

Reasonable Accommodation.
Title VII requires an employer to

B.

1.

Make reasonable accommodation for a current or prospective
employees religious observance or practice, unless

2.

Such accommodation would impose undue hardship o n the employers
business.

Accommodation Requires Only Minimal Costs
1.

An employer need not bear more than minimal costs in accommodating
religious beliefs or practices.
Case Examples

)

Transworld Airlines v . Hardison , 9 7 S .Ct. 2264 ( 1 97 7 ) is the
landmark case in this area. An employer belonged to the Worldwide
Church of God, which observes a Saturday Sabbath. But when he
chose to move to a new job in the company , he was placed on the
bottom of the seniority list consistent with a collective
bargaining agreement, so that he was unable to avoid some Saturday
work.
Numerous attempts were made by the company to accommodate
his belief in a Saturday Sabbath by unsuccessfully attempting to
get volunteers to substitute for him. When he refused to show up
for work several Saturdays in a row, he was fired. He argued that
under the reasonable accommodation provision, TWA was required to
ignore the seniority rights of other employees under the
collective bargaining agreement and assign them to work in his
place , or that other employees should have been offered a premium
to work in his place , or that he should be allowed to work a four
day week. The Supreme Court rejected his argument and ruled that
TWA had satisfied Title VII when it attempted without success to
arrange a job swap with other employees. Further, an employee
need not bear more than "diminimus costs" nor violate seniority
rights of co-workers in accommodating the religious beliefs and
practices of its employees. The seniority system itself
represented a significant concession to both the religious and
secular needs of all its employees , said the Court.
(This case represented a setback for the EEOC which expected
extensive accommodation by an employer under early EEOC Religious
Discrimination Guidelines. )

I
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c.

Accommodation Under Present EEOC Religious Discrimination Guidelines,
An employer's refusal to accommodate is justified only when the

employer can demonstrate that a hardship would result from each
"
available alternative method of accommodation. The Guidelitii!'S"list
the following alternatives for accommodating religious practices which
conflict with a work schedule:
1.

2.

)

3.
D.

a.

Publicize policies regarding accommodation and voluntary
substitutions;

b.

Promote a n atmosphere i n which substitutions are favorable
regarded; and

c

Provide . bulletin board, central file or other means for
matching volunteer substitutes with position for which
substitutes are needed.

Flexible scheduling of work , such as:
a.

flexible arrival and departure times;

b.

floating or optional holidays;

c.

flexible work breaks;

d.

use of lunch time in exchange for early departure;

e.

staggered work hours; and

f.

permitting employee to make up lost time due to observance of
religious practices.

Lateral transfers and change of job assignments (Sec. 1605 . 2 )

Employer Hardship Under Present EEOC Religious Discrimination
Guidelines
1.

)

Voluntary substitutes and swaps. However, the Guidelines are not
satisfied with leaving it up to the employees to arrange the swap,
the employer must "facilitate" the swaps. Some of the suggested
means of facilitation are:

Costs: The Guidelines provide that the "minimum costs" standards
declared in Hardison will be measured with consideration of the
"size and operating cost of the employer and the number of
individuals who will in fact require a particular accommodation. "
However, the Guidelines go on to say that the EEOC will "assume
that the ·infrequent payment of premium wages for a substitute or
the payment of premium wages while a more permanent accommodation
is being sought are costs which an employer can be required to
bear as a means of providing a reasonable accommodation. "
9-2

2.

)

E.

Seniority rights: The Guidelines provide that voluntary
substitutes or swaps do not constitute an undue hardship where
those arrangements do not violate a bona fide seniority system.
(Sec.
1605 . 2 )

Selection Procedures Under Present EEOC Religious Discrimination
Guidelines.
1.

Tests and other selection procedures must be scheduled to
accommodate religious practices if they do not create undue
hardships.

2.

Pre-hiring inquiries concerning the availability of an applicant
to work during certain hours is prohibited unless the employer can
show that they:

3.

a.

Did not have an exclusionary effect on present o r prospective
employees needing an accommodation;

b,

Were justt fied as a business necessity.

The EEOC will infer that the need for an accommodation influenced
a decision to reject an applicant when:
a.

The employer makes an inquiry into the applicant's
availability prior to making an offer for employment without
having a business necessity justification;

b.

After the employer has determined that the applicant made an
accommodation , the employer rejects a qualified applicant.
The burden is then on the employer to demonstrate that the
qualified applicant was rejected for factors other than the
need for religious accommodation or that accommodation without
undue hardship was not possible.
(Sec. 1605 . 3 )

)
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X.

National Origin Discrimination (Title VII and the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986)
A.

Definition
1.

Title VII does not define the term n4tional origin, but the EEOC
National Origin Discrimination Guidelines defines it as:
including, but not limited to , the denial of equal employment
opportunity because of an individual ' s , or his or her
ancestors' place of origin; or because an individual has the
physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national
origin group.

2.

But the EEOC National Origin Discrimination Guidelines go on to
. provide that the EEOC . "will examine with particular concern" alle
gations of the denial of equal employment opportunity for reasons
which are grou�ded in national origin considerations , such as:
a.

Marriage to or association with persons of a national origin
group;

b.

Membership in , or association with an organization identifying
with or seeking to promote the interests of national origin
groups;

c.

Attendance or participation in schools churches , temples or
mosques , generally used by persons of a national origin
groups; and

d.

Because a n individual' s name o r spouse' s name is associated
with a national origin group. (Sec. 1 606 . l )

)

3.

Standard of proof of discrimination
a.

The EEOC will apply gerteral Title VII principals such as
disparate treatment and adverse impact to national origin
discrimination. (Sec.
1 606 . 1 )

b.

The IRCA requires proof o f "discriminatory intent" in
employment discrimination cases brought under that law.
However, the U . S . Justice Department rules announce that for
its purposes direct or circumstancial evidence , including
statistical evidence. will permitted to show that an employer
is guilty of a "pattern or practice of knowing and intentional
discrimination. " (Emphasis mine) The courts will probably
follow the same or a similar standard.

i
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4.

The EEOC has · already informed employers that in its view the IRCA
does not permit discrimination against employees of any ethnic
background, and has cautioned employers that to avoid violations
of both the IRCA and Title VII it should watch their employment
practices in several areas:
a.

B.

Hiring practices based on place of origin, physical, cultural
or linguistic characteristics common to certain national
origin groups

b.

1
Discrimination against persons based upon accent or speech
manners peculiar to certain national origin groups

c.

Harrassment based upon national origin, such as racial slurs

d.

Requirements that employees speak only English, and English
fluency requirements

e.

Height o r weight requirements

f.

Employment tests

g.

Citizenship requirements or preferences (What about the
"preference" of U . S . citizens permitted under the IRCA? )

BFOQ Exceptions.
National origin may be a BFOQ but the exception, as with all other
Title VII exceptions will be strictly construed. (National Origin
Discrimination Guidelines , Sec. 1606 . 4 )

C.

Discrimination A gainst Aliens
1.

The EEOC Guidelines on National Origin Discrimination provide that
where citizenship requirements have the purpose or effect of
discriminating against an �ndividual on the basis of national
origin , they are prohibited by Title VII.

2.

However, in Espinoza v . Farah Manufacturing Comp any, 4 1 4 U . S . 86
( 1 973) ) , the u.s. Supreme Court made it clear the Title VII does
case, the
not protect aliens against discr'imination. In this
court ruled that a female, Mexican job applicant. had been rejected
not because of he.r national origin , but because she was an alien.
(But the Supreme Court has also extended aliens some protection
from discrimination in public employment through the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the u.s. Con s titution and the Civil Rights Act of
1866.

)
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CAUTION: Whfle Title VII may not protect aliens against discrimi
nation , the !RCA of 1 986 does precisely that.
3.

Exception for jobs involving "political functions"
a.

State laws excluding aliens from . significant elective and
non-elective jobs have been upheld by the U . S . Supreme Court
on the basis of their "political function"--jobs whose
performance goes to the heart of representative government.
Such jobs have been held to include public school teachers ,
police officers , and probation officers.
Three permanent resident aliens applied for jobs as probation
officers with the Los Angeles County Probation Dep artment but
were rejected on the basis of a California law that required
such officers to be U . S . citizens. In upholding the legality
of their rejection, the Supreme Court reviewed past rulings of
upholding laws excluding non-u .s. citizens from holding jobs
as police officers and school teachers. Because probation
officers a l so had the power to exercise coercive power and
control over peo ple , U . S . citizenship is an appropriate
limitation on those who exercise it. (Cabell v.
Chavez-Salido, 102 S .Ct. 7 35 ( 1 982) )

b.

Tennessee restricts the job as police officer (T . C . A .
38-8-106) and public school teacher (T .C.A. 49-5-202) t o u . s .
citizens.

c.

But public jobs involving duties that d o uot require the
exercise of policy making responsibility or broad discretion
"that requires the routine exercise of authority over
individuals" probably do not meet the political function test
and cannot be restricted to U . S . citizens. (Bernol v .
( 1 984)
Fainter , _ u s .
.•

D.

Employee Selection Procedures
1.

The EEOC National Origin Discrimination Guidelines provide that
the Uniform Guidelines for Emplo ee Selection apply to an
employer's selection procedures .
Sec 1 60 1 . 6 )
• .

2.

Height and weight requirements
a.

The EEOC National Origin Guidelines say t�at the employer is
required to evaluate height and weight selection procedures
for adverse impact regardless of whether the total selection
process has an adverse impact; they are an exception to the
"bottom line" concept.

'

I
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b.

E.

The same standards and statistical methods that apply to
establishing sex discrimination on the basis of height and
weight requirements apply to establishing national origin
discrimination on the basis of height and weight requirements.

English Language Requirements
1.

Applied all the time: The EEOC will presume that such a rule
violates Title VII and will closely scrutinize it. (National
Origin Discrimination Guidelines, Sec. 1 606 . 7 )

2.

Applied only at certain times: If an employer believes it has a
business necessity for a part-time English only rule , the employer
is required to so notify the employee both of the existence of the
rule, and when it applies. (National Origin Discrimination
Guidelines , Sec. 1606 . 7 )

3.

English proficiency may be justified on the basis of business
necessity.

)
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